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The Introduction of DDT and related pesticides in the war
against malaria in Asia, Africa and Latin America during the
1940s had a dramatic impact on anopheles mosquito populations and
consequently on the worldwide incidence of malaria.C13 The
initial succeas of pesticide spraying created Immense optimism on
the part of health officials and economic planners. For the
first tine. It appeared that malaria, which had had such a
devastating impact on human populations and had retarded economic
development in tropical and sub-tropical areas, could be
controlled or even eradicated. Thirty years later, however,
malaria has made a major comeback. In India, where the use of
pesticides had reduced the annual incidence of malaria from 100
million cases in 1952 to 50,000 cases in 1962, the annual number
of cases rose again to over half a million in 1970. Similar
patterns of decline and resurgence occurred in Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Mexico, Central America and East Africa-£2-4]
The resurgence of malaria in many areas has been linked to
the so-called "green-revolution", the development of large scale
agricultural projects combined with the extensive use of
fertilizers and pesticides to increase agricultural production.
The heavy use of pesticides succeeded in controlling some crop
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destroying peats, however, it had the unforseen conaequence of
producing DDT resistant strains of anopheles mosquitoes, short
circuiting vector control measures and making possible the
recommencement of malaria transmission in areas in which the
disease had been brought under control. A World Health
Organization technical report concluded in 1976 that, "resistance
is probably the single biggest obstacle in the struggle against
vector borne disease and is mainly responsible for preventing
successful malaria eradication in many countries." The report
went on to note that, "Evidence has also been accumulated to show
that resistance in many vectors has been...a side effect of
agricultural pesticide use.'* C5, p. 161,62
These findings led the WHO, in conjunction with the World
Bank and the United Nations Development Programme, to allocate
nearly three million dollars for research into anopheles
resistance and plasmodia transmission between 1976 and 1980,
making this research the primary focus of their attack on
malaria.C5,p.
The history of malaria control in the lowveld areas of South
Africa and Swaziland mirrors the worldwide picture of initial
success and optimism during the 1950s and 1960s, followed by a
resurgence of malaria during the seventies. In the lowlying
areas of the Eastern Transvaal and Natal in South Africa,
intensive efforts to control malaria through vector, -spraying
brought the annual notification rate for malaria down from over
10,000 cases a year in the late thirties and early forties to an
overage of three hundred cases per year between 1957 and 1970.
Notification subsequently rose dramatically however, with 1500
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cases reported in 1971 and 7500 cases in 1978, C7, p. 131] In
Swaziland, the annual official incidence of malaria declined from
785O cases in 1946 to less than 100 cases per year during the
late fifties and early sixties, only to rise again to over 1000
cases a year in the late seventies(see table 1).
As elsewhere, the resurgence of malaria in these two areas
has been associated with the introduction or expansion of large
scale agricultural production. Vet in contrast to the general
pattern, increases in the incidence of malaria in South Africa
and Swaziland have not been accompanied by the appearance of
pesticide resistant strains of anopheles mosquitoes* [83 This is
important, for it suggests that the relationship between "green
revolutions" and malaria is complex and that vector adaptation
may be only one factor in the equation, or causal chain. Changes
in agroecosystems, settlement patterns, and labor utilization,
associated with the introduction of "green revolution"
technologies, nay contribute to a resurgence of malaria, as well
as to the spread of malaria into areas in which it has been
previously unknown or of little importance C3-53 If this is ao,
then the current WHO emphasis on biomedical research may be
somewhat shortsighted, attacking part of the causal chain but
largely ignoring possible socio-economic determinants of the
current rising tide of malaria. The present paper examines the
decline and resurgence of malaria in Swaziland within the context
of Swaziland's changing political economy over the last thirty
years, in an effort to illuminate some of the socio-economic
determinants in the equation between increased agricultural
development and malaria resurgence.
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Malaria Epidemics and Control in Swaziland to 1959
Prior to the coramencement of vector control measures in the
late 1940a, malaria was a major health problem in Swaziland-C93
During moat of the colonial period, annual outbreaks of malaria
occurred during the summer and autumn months from December to
May, These seasonal epidemics incapacitated large numbers of
Swazia as well as a few Europeans- In most years, the epidemic
was limited to the lower regions of the country, which were
hyperendemic, and was marked by relatively few deaths. There
were however, several years in which the annual epidemic spread
into the higher regions of the country and produced a much larger
number of cases and fatalities. While the absence of case
finding efforts make it impossible to know how large a toll such
regional epidemics took prior to World War XI, it was estimated
that 50,000 cases occurred in the low and middleveld regions of
Swaziland during the 1946 epidemic, a figure which corresponds to
roughly 26* of the total population of Swaziland at that time.
Nearly 8,000 cases were actually seen by medical authorities that
year.
Colonial medical opinion attributed these major upsurges in
malaria to abnormally heavy rainfall and increased vector
breeding. Yet they were also a product of colonial economic
policies, which included the alienation of large tracks of Swazi
land designed to provide European settlers with farms and ranches
and to create an abundant supply of Swazi labor. The
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aubordination of Swazi economic Interests to those of European
settlers led to the semi-proletarianization of Swazi
herdsmen/cultivators and prevented many Swazi families from
producing enough food to meet their subsistence needs, forcing
them to become dependent on food purchased with cash earned
through the sale of their labor, or, less frequently, their
cattle. This dependency created a state of nutritional
vulnerability in which economic crises, such as the world wide
depression of the early 1930s, which severely restricted Swazi
employment opportunities and drastically cut cattle prices, or
the loss of crops through drought, created famine conditions.
Famine, in turn, greatly increased the severity of subsequent
outbreaks of malaria, as acute malnutrition, combined with heavy
parasite Infestations, created a fatal synergism, which was most
pronouncied in young children. In addition, famine conditions
forced Swazi men and women living in the hyperendemic lowveld
areas of Swaziland to seek employment and food assistance in the
more economically developed higher regions of the country- Since
many of these people were parasite carriers, they increased the
resevolr of infection and thus opportunities for transmission In
what, were normally malaria free areas of Swaziland.
British attempts to control malaria In Swaziland prior to
the late 1940s were extremely limited. While Europeans living in
the lower regions of the country were advised to put screens on
their windows and to avoid walking out of doors in the evening,
no health instruction was given to the Swazi. Nor were any
efforts made to clear bush or spray larval sites in Swazi
settlement areas. Instead, malaria control measures consisted of
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distributing free quinine through a variety of formal (clinic3
and hospitals) and informal(chiefa, police and storekeepers)
channels to the Swazi during actual outbreaks. While the Swazi
appear to have appreciated the protective benefits of quinine,
the methods of distribution were at beat haphazard and many Swazi
received no quinine. CIO]
Following a massive outbreak of malaria in 1937, during
which it was conservatively estimated that 5000 Swazis died from
the disease, a malaria control scheme was proposed by the
Principal Medical Officer for Swaziland. [113 The scheme was based
on practices which had been successfully implemented in Natal and
Zululand, beginning in 1933, by Dr. Park Ross and involved both
anti-larval and anti-adult measures.C123 Swaziland, however, was
not Natal and did not possess a large sugar industry, which was
willing to underwrite the cost of a malaria control scheme in
order to prevent losses to their labor force. There in fact were
no comparatively large European enterprises in Swaziland to
defray or justify the expense of control measures. Despite
British efforts to stimulate European farming and ranching these
enterprises remained relatively small in scale, employing only a
quarter of all Swazi wage labor in 1936, The remaining three
quarters were employed in South Africa. The Swazia were in fact
viewed primarily as exporters of labor within the wider southern
Africa regional economy. Since most of this labor came from the
wore densely settled middleveld areas of the country, which were
relatively malaria free and only occasionally affected by malaria
outbreaks, the benefits of eradication did not outweigh the
costs. The colonial administration, therefore, rejected the
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proposed malaria control scheme aa too expenaive.[133
In the wake of World War II, however, the Colonial
Development Corporation proposed the eatabliahment of an
irrigation project for growing augar cane in Swaziland'a soil
rich but rain poor lowveld ea part of Britain's post-war effort
to lncreaae overall colonial production levels. The proposal
made malaria control a pressing issue. As early as 1931, the
Principal Medical Officer for Swaziland had warned that the
development of sugar estates in the lowveld could greatly
increaae the malaria problem in Swaziland. "If there were any
works requiring the collection of large numbers of nativea in
compounds in the lowveld the malaria factor would be a very
aerioua one and if natives from the non-endemic areaa had to be
introduced, the mortality among them would be very high."C14]
Thia prophetic warning was repeated in 1944 by R. W. Thorton,
Agricultural Advisor to the High Commiaaioner for Swaziland,
Bechuanaland and Baautoland,
Those who advocate settlement in the lowveld stress the
grand opportunity of creating irrigation settlementa
where large numbers of families can be eatablished in
close proximity. I have no doubt. . .that such
settlements nay be possible but there is little doubt
that the malaria trouble will then be aggravated owing
to the multitude of email pools which will furnish
breeding grounds for mosquitoes. Naturally, these
breeding grounds can be treated but that means
establiahing a proper medical service to supervise and
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see that remedial measures are carried out. C153
In short the creation of agricultural schemes in the lowveld
required the implementation of malaria control measures. Whether
such Measures would have been adopted without the development of
the sugar schemes is open to debate. What is clear, is that the
decision to establish the lowveld projects, and the potential
labor losses which the projects would have suffered in the
absence of controls, were the primary motivating factors behind
the implementation of a malaria control project in Swaziland
following the War.
The first nucleus of a malaria control unit came into
existence in 1945 and residual hut spraying with DOT began on a
limited basis in 1949. Spraying was expanded to cover the
hyperendemic areas of the country, primarily in the lowveld,
during the 1950s. The program was an initial success, and except
for a moderate outbreak in 1953, following a major drought in
1952 and the refusal of some European farmers to spray their
compounds, the number of reported cases dropped steadily
throughout the decade. After only three years of spraying, the
parasite rates in children living in sprayed areas of the lowveld
had dropped from 65% to 2«. From. 1956, spraying was gradually
withdrawn from those areas in which no new cases had been
reported in the past two years, and by 1958 only a fifteen mile
protective barrier along Swaziland's border with Mozambique,
where no control measures were in effect, was being treated.
Entomological investigations during 1958 and 1959 showed that a.
gambiae, the primary vector in Swaziland, had almost totally
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shifted ita living and eating patterns, resting out of doora and
feeding off of animals instead of man a& an adaptive reaponse to
hut spraying.[16, pp.3-4J While recognizing the need to continue
surveillance work and the potential threat of malaria being
reintroduced via migrants from Mozambique, Colonial medical
authorities stated in 1959, that malaria had been all but
eradicated in Swaziland and ceased spraying activities for fear
that continued spraying might produce DDT resistant strains of
mosquitoes.C173
The Sugar Industry. Migrant Labor and Malaria.
1959-1978
The succesful control of malaria in the lowveld permitted
work to begin on the Colonial Development Corporation's
irrigation project in the northern lowveld. The construction of
canals began in the mid-fifties and sugar production got under
way in 1958. A second major irrigation scheme, Ubombo Ranches
Ltd, initiated by the British owned firm of Lonhro, commenced
sugar production in the southern lowveld at approximately the
same time.CIS, pp.94-95]
Ironically, the development of sugar production in the
lowveld created conditions which encouraged a resurgence of
malaria in the areas in which sugar was grown. It thus
undermined the effectiveness of the malaria control measures it
had been largely responsible for initiating. A flare up of
indigenous cases occurred around the sugar estates in 1960 and
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larger outbreaks occurred in 1367 and 1972, The number of
recorded case continiued to rise during the late seventies and
began to spread out from the sugar estates to other" areas of the
lowveld and into parts of the mlddleveld.
i
Irrigation agriculture, by its very nature, can create
conditions suitable for the breeding of mosquitoes-C3,4J While
well maintained canals are incompatable with the reproduction of
a. qamblae, which breeds best in small standing pools of water,
runover, seepage and improper maintenance produced breeding
opportunities in the lowveld projects, especially during periods
of heavy rainfall. Moreover, the extremely poor condition of
housing provided for sugar workers and the near absence of
sanitation measures during the late fifties and early sixties,
produced, as R.W. Thorton had predicted, additional ideal
breeding sites for a^ gambiae around the workers' quarters,C19,
20] Since the malaria control program concentrated on hut
spraying -and included only irregular and limited provisions for
larval control, these environments produced an abundant supply of
potential vectors, although it appears from entomological
reports, that the most efficient vectors a^ gambiae species "A"
and "B" had been eliminated, leaving only species "C" which was
less efficient, though still a potential vector.C16, p.4J
Additional vectors were introduced vis the major rivers from
which the irrigation schemes drew their water. These-, waterways
flowed from Swaziland to Mozambique, where species "A" and "8*'
continued to exist. During heavy breeding seasons, these more
efficient vectors entered into the irrigation schemes along the
river valleys.(16, p.23
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Finally, while most of the vector population in Swaziland
had adapted to hut spraying by resting out of doors and feeding
off of animals, some were still found feeding off of man in huts
during periods of heavy rainfall and vector breeding- This
return to man was particularly marked in the irrigation schemes
because there were no domestic or wild animals there to serve as
alternative hosts.C21,p.4, 3,p.44 3
While the sugar schemes provided abundant opportunities for
vector breeding and malaria transmission, they would not have
contributed to a resurgence of malaria in Swaziland had they not
also been responsible for reintroducing parasite carriers into
Swaziland, and thus providing sources of infection for the vector
population. By 1959, a decade of control measures had reduced
the parasite load of the Swazi population to near zero. Of
15,682 persona tested in that year only 173 or .11 X were found
to carry parasites in their blood. This compared to 23* in
1950. C16, p.2) Thus had the sugar estates employed only Swazi
workers there would have been few opportunities for
transmission. Unfortunately, they chose not to do thia and, for
economic reasons, employed large numbers of workers from
Mozambique, despite repeated warnings by malaria control officers
that the use of these workers, who, coming from an area in which
no malaria control measures were in effect, represented a threat
to the health of Swazi workers and their families, as well as to
the general population of the areas surrounding the sugar
estates.C22-23]
The problem which the use of foreign labor creates for
malaria control efforts has been noted by M. Prothero and
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others-C243 However, little attention has been given in these
studies to the reasons why foreign labor is employed in
particular industries. It is important to examine these reasons
in order to understand the connection between the resurgence of
malaria and the changing political economy of Swaziland.
The rapid penetration of foreign capital into Swaziland -and
the development of mining, forestry, and agricultural industries
during the mid fifties and early sixties created a growing demand
for Swazi labor. This demand soon outsrlpped local supplies and
Swazi wage-earners were able to "play the' market" and be
selective in their choice of employment.C25, pp.48-513 More often
than not, Swazi men avoided employment on the sugar estates of
the lowveld. While the wages paid by the sugar industry were
comparable to those aof other agricultural industries within
Swaziland, averaging two shillings and four pense per day in
1960, the living and working conditions were much poorer on the
sugar estates than elsewhere. The Labor inspector report for
1957 includes the following evaluation of conditions '• on the
Ubombo Ranches Ltd. Estates.
Of the major projects visited thus far Ubombo Ranches
appears to be the most backward in outlook and planning
in the labour field. Unless the company is prepared to
offer a higher standard of housing, considerably better
rations and develop a more modern outlook for the
welfare of its labour force, it is likely to find
itself unable to attract labour in the present
competitive field.C19]
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Conditions had improved little by 1963. Inadequate housing, the
absence of proper sanitation facilities, insufficient rations,
including no provision for family rations, irregulatitiea in
payment practices, and excessive work hours—all of which
industry representatives attributed to the high capital outlays
required to start up production and the subsequent need to reduce
labor coats--figured prominently in the reasons given by Swazl
sugar workers for the major strike which occurred in the Big Bend
area in March of 1963.C20, p.14-15.3
The industry's difficulties in attracting Swazi labor during
the late fifties and early sixties, especially during peak
periods in Swazi domestic agriculture, led them to employ large
numbers of women and children to perform the lighter tasks, such
oa weeding, and to recruit men from Mozambique to cut cane and
perform other heavy labor.E263
The number of Mozambique workers employed in the Sugar
estates continued to grow during the late sixties despite a cool
down in the Swazi economy and declining employment opportunities,
which forced more Swazi men to seek employment on the Sugar
Estates. This increasing use of Mozambique labor was apparently
a response on the part of the sugar industry to the growing
Militancy of Swazi workers during this period. The militancy, in
turn, was a product of the declining mobility of Swazi labor in
the face of a contracting 30b market and was first given
expression in the 1963 Big Bend Strike- [25, p.51-52.3 Faced
with rising worker protest among Swazi laborers, the management
of the sugar estates opted to continue employing Mozambique
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workers who were seen as less militant and more manageable than
their Swazi counterparts.
The colonial government, which was committed to the
agricultural development of the lowveld, as well as to the
interests of large scale agricultural capital, refused to limit
the use of Mozambique labor, despite the protests of Swazi
workersC27] and the clear warnings of health officials that the
continuation of the practice might lead to the renewed
transmission of malaria in the lowveld.£23,16,p.43 With
independence in 1969, however, the sugar industries use of
Mozambique labor instead of local Swazi workers, became a
political issue. While the newly Independent Swazi government
continued to serve the needs of large scale agricultural.capital,
restrictions on the use of foreign labor were imposed on all
industries within Swaziland in 1970. The head of the malaria
control unit in Swaziland referred to these restrictions as "the
beginning of the end of malaria in Swaziland."C283 -
It would appear however that while the restrictions reduced
the number of Mozambique workers on the estates, they did not
prevent the movement of illegal immigrants, who, in the face of
severe economic dislocations In Mozambique during the early
seventies, continued to seek work in Swaziland. The restrictions
also appear to have come too late. While the number of
Mozambique workers declined through the seventies, • the-- outbreaks
associated with their presence on the estates prior to this time
created indigenous reservoirs of infection among Swazi workers
and their families. [29,p.6] These reservoirs, moreover, were not
limited to the immediate area of the sugar estates, but were
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spread more widely through the lowveld and into certain areas o£
the middleveld--which had been free of malaria since the early
1950s--as a result of the migrant nature of Swazi labor. Thus
more recent outbreaks of malaria in Swaziland have had a wider
case distribution than those of the late sixities and early
seventies, which were more dependent on imported foci of
infection and were more closely identified with the sugar
estates.[30] In short, the extensive use of Mozambique workers
during the sixties and early seventies contributed to the
re-establishment of malaria parasites among the Inhabitants of
Swaziland, which in turn helped fuel the rising tide of
Indigenous malaria cases during the late seventies.
The development of the Sugar Estates along with other
economic activies such as coal mining and cotton growing,
contributed further to the resurgence of malaria in Swaziland by
encouraging the movement of peoples from the higher regions of
the country, where experience with malaria was limited and thus
resistance levels low, into the lowveld. This movement occurred
primarily between the southern middle and highveld areas of the
country, where land pressures and limited economic opportunities
had historically made the area a primary source of migrant labor,
and the northern lowveld, where much of the post-war economic
development was occurring. Attracted by these opportunities and
believing that malaria had been controlled, a large number of
highland families resettled in the lowveld during the late
fifties and early sixties- Consequently, the population of the
northern lowveld grew by 144* between 1956 and 1966, compared to
a nation wide increase of only 58?s. By contrast the southern
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highland districts of Hlatikulu and Mankiana grew by only 33* and
23« respectively over thia period, reflecting in port the
movement of people from these areas to the new centers of
development in the lowveld-C313 During the next decade the
population of the irrigation scheme areas doubled,reflecting the
movement of over 8000 people from the higher areas of Swaziland
into the lowveld.C323 These migrants joined a lowveld population
whose resistance level had already been lowered by a decade of
effective malaria control neaaures and low levels of transmission
prior to the commencement of sugar production. Together the two
populations that grew up around the sugar estates provided a
fertile field for the recrudescence of malaria.
While the economic development of the lowveld fueled the
resurgence of malaria in Swaziland by creating new vector
breeding sites, reintroducing parasite carriers, and by
attracting new inhabitants who lacked resistance to the disease,
the resurgence was abbetted by the inability of health
authorities to maintain effective controls against the disease.
Thia inability was caused in part by difficulties in identifying
and screening migrant laborers coming from Mozambique. The sugar
industry's lack of cooperation in identfying these workers
combined with the illegal status of theae workers after 1970,
increased these difficulties.C23]
Other failinga can be attributed to organizational problems
and to deficiencies in the allocation of manpower and transport
resources. A 1978 report on malaria control measures in
Swaziland by a WHO malariologist concluded that,
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While reviewing the spraying program carried out this
year it la observed that the areas were not defined,
advanced apraying programmes were not prepared,
adequate manpower and transport was not provided,
proper training of temporary apraymen was not. done, and
necessary spraypumps were not available. All of these
led to poor spraying eo that it could not be completed
before the transmission season. Field visits revealed
that even positive kraals were found unsprayed. Under
these circumstances, it is very difficult to expect any
impact of spraying activities carried out during the
past years. C29, p.43
The report was additionally critical of case finding and
treatment procedures.
The reasons behind these failings are not discussed in the
report and are beyond the scope of this paper. Let it suffice to
say that both the Swaziland Ministry of Health and the Colonial
Health Department in Swaziland, from the beginning of the
colonial period up to the present, have been chronically
underfunded and forced to rely heavily on outside sources to fund
disease control programs. This outside funding has not always
been available. Consequently, health officials have had to make
difficult choices in allocating their limited resources. The
recent outbreak of cholera in Swaziland, beginning in 1980,
forced the ministry to direct a large portion of its resources
and manpower to cholera and water-borne disease control measures
and away from the control of other diseases, such as malaria and
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tuberculosis, which are viewed as lesa immediate health
problems. The long term costs of this perhaps unavoidable
decision, however, may be high. As the above 1978 WHO review
concluded.
If high priority is not immediately given to take
necessary action for preventing the possible future
outbreak, it may bring about a tremendous setback in
the over-all socio-economic development of the country
as it is clear from the fact that the present malaria
flare-up has hit mostly the people in the areas of
vital economic projects, e.g. agricultural development
1 ike sugar, rice, and cotton, and other development
projects like roads, railways and mines where a large
number of labourers both from within and outside the
country are aggregating-C29,pp.6-8.3
The potential impact of malaria on lowveld industries and
particularly on the sugar industry, which contributed 53* of
Swaziland's foreign exchange in 1983 and accounted for nearly 40*
of domestic wage employment, would appear to necessitate a
recommittment to malaria control. CIS,p.108,33,p.95] At the same
time, the industry's role in the resurgence of malaria suggests
that the industry itself needs to shoulder some of the financial
burden that this effort will require. -..._. - - .
While the lowveld populations and . industries are presently
at greatest risk, the possibility of wider regional epidemics on
the scale of pre-control outbreaks cannot be ruled out. The fact
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that recent outbreaks have been largely limited to the lowveld la
due to the partial effectiveness of control measures, but is also
the result of increased employment opportunities in the lowveld
region over the past thirty years. These opportunities have
restricted the movement of infected Swazi workers, and thus
potential parasite carriers into the higher regions of the
country in search of employment during periods of economic crisis
within lowveld households, such as was created by the recent
drought in 1982. The spread of malaria into the higher regions of
the country has consequently been avoided. Thus ironically,
while the resurgence of malaria can be traced in part to the
development of the sugar industry, this development has at the
same time helped to limit the resurgence of malaria primarily to
the lowveld. It must be remembered, however, that the health of
the sugar Industry and its ability to absorb a population which
is highly dependent on wage employment opportunities to meet
subsistence needs, is Itself dependent on international market
forces which control the price of sugar. At the present time,
only a quarter of Swaziland's sugar production is protected from
worldwide price fluctuations through agreements with the European
Economic Community. The remaining three-quarters has been
subject to a general downward trend in world sugar prices since
1979.C34 p.35,33,p.953 Any major downturn in world sugar prices
could severely affect Swaziland's sugar industry and employment
opportunities in the lowveld- This in turn could lead to a
re-establishment of earlier patterns of population movement which
contributed to regional epidemics•
Given the complex relationship between malaria and patterns
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of economic development in Swaziland over the past eighty years,
and particularly since World War II, any program designed to cope
with the country's malaria problem must go beyond purely
bio-medical responses and combine more effective malaria
surveillance and vector control neasures, including the screening
of workers from outside the country, with renewed efforts to
diversify economic development, especially in the lowveld, and to
avoid the dangers inherent in the development of a monoculture
economy.C353 In addition, domestic food production and
distribution needs to be strengthened in order to protect Swazi
households from periodic food crises, which historically have
contributed to the severity of malaria outbreaks.C363 Without
this type of broad based economic approach to Malaria control,
drought conditions, such have occurred in southern Africa over
the past two years, combined with a set back in the sugar
industry and ineffective control measures could set the stage for
a large scale regional epidemic in the future.
Conclusion
The history of malaria in Swaziland over the last thirty
years indicates that changing patterns of economic development
associated with the introduction of large scale agricultural
projects in an area in which malaria had been previously, brought
under control can result in a resurgence of malaria transmission
without-the emergence of pesticide resistant strains of anopheles
mosquitoes. Ineffective malaria control measures within the
sugar estates and more widely in the lowveld; the creation of
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Ideal breeding sites for malarial•vectora within the Irrigation
projects; the Ill-advised use of foreign workers who were known
to be potential parasite carriers, in order to cut labor costs;
and demographic shifts, which have led to the build-up of a
non-immune population in close proximity to malaria vectora and
carriers; all contributed to the re-establishment of malaria as a
serious health problem in Swaziland. In addition, the
deprioritization of malaria control in the wake of the 1980
cholera outbreak, the growing dependence of Swaziland on sugar
production, and of Swazl households, particularly In the lowveld,
on employment in the sugar industry inorder to meet their
subsistence requirements, raise the possibility that the current
malaria problem could get much worse.
The Importance of economic and political factors in the
recent resurgence of malaria in Swaziland strongly suggests that
renewed efforts to bring malaria under control, both in Swaziland
and elsewhere. Include attempts to better understand and deal
with non-biological determinants of malaria as well as research
into anopheles resistance and plasmodia transmission.
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TABLE 1
Reported Cases of Malaria per 1O00 Total Population*
.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
1951 *•»«*«««•*««»*•**««•««»«*
1952 «**•»*»*«*»
1953 ***«ft*»*»ft
1954 «*«»
1955 «««•«*
1956 «•••
1957 • «
1958
1959 «•
1960 • ««#
1961
1962 ••
1963 *
1964 ««
1965.»•«
1966 •«<•
1967 ««****•*«»
1968 •#
1969 •
1970 •
1971 •••
1972 «*«**«*•*«
1973 «•
1974 ••
1975 ••••• '
1976 •«•»
1977
1978
1979 «»»•••*•»«»•»
1980
1981 »•»«•• •••»* •«••«••««
* These rates represent observed cases divided by the total
population of Swaziland. Since most of the cases of malaria
occurred in the lowveld region of Swaziland the actual population
at risk is much smaller than the total population and the actual
rate of reported cases for the lowveld is would be much higher
than those reported here.
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